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ECONOMIC CONTROL REGULATIONS:
A DESCRIPTIVE COMMENTARY
EDWARD R. LEV*
Laws are like cobwebs, someone once said. If a trifling and
powerless thing falls into them, they hold it fast; but let it be some-
thing weightier, and it breaks through. There is enough truth in that
to give a practitioner pause. The purpose of this article, nevertheless,
is not to complain about the linear distance between the announced
purpose of legislation and the manner in which it is applied, nor to
engage in aimless detours about the nature of law. Instead, it is to
make some effort to put the legislation and the regulations into readable
prose with such comments as fellow practitioners might find useful.
The regulations are detailed and complex. No attempt will be made
to track them into their gullies and crevices. The reader is cautioned
that he must parse them carefully to advise on a particular problem.
The draftsmanship in many instances is puzzling and obscure which
perhaps can be attributed to their extensive coverage and the haste of
their preparation. The Government has conceded that their effective-
ness will depend on voluntary compliance. The presumption is that most
lawyers and accountants will honor their duty to persuade clients to
obey the law by simply telling them what it is. But once across the
ethical bridge, there are many available routes through the forest. The
purpose of this article is to illuminate a few of the road signs. .
Apologies are submitted in advance for errors which result from
oversimplification, deliberate omission, inaccurate paraphrasing, or
changes in the law after submission for publication. Moreover, there
is no way to tell at this stage which regulations the government will
choose to enforce. It would be naive to assume that enforcement will
be evenhanded and imprudent to think that the regulations will not
change. Their underlying purpose is to cool off the inflationary furnace.
* LL.B. University of Cincinnati, 1955; LL.M. Northwestern University, 1956;
Member of the Boston law firm of Sullivan & Worcester.
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The primary targets of regulation are the giant companies and
unions whose wage and price decisions dominate the economy, although
such decisions are concededly less a function of regulation than of
political negotiation. The smaller companies and employee units were
included either because of their collective impact or perhaps to impress
everyone into the war against inflation.
Inasmuch as a lawyer must have a general yet thorough awareness
of the new economic control scheme, this article will focus on the
congressional legislation, executive orders and administrative regula-
tions which have been promulgated as the framework of this scheme.
Particular attention will be accorded to those regulations covering
wages and salaries, prices, rents, and dividends and interest. Further,
the reporting rules will be explained and analyzed. Finally, the article
will conclude with a discussion and an analysis of the judicial decisions
which have upheld the legality of the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970.
I. THE LEGISLATION
On August 15, 1970, Congress granted the President authority to
stabilize the economy. 1 A year later the President did so by issuing
Executive Order No. 11615,2 which set in motion Phase I of his sta-
bilization program. Its purpose was to freeze the economy, or at least
chill it, for ninety days. The Order covered "prices, rents, wages and
salaries" and prohibited increases in those categories beyond the levels
reached in the thirty-day period preceding the date of the Order. It
excluded raw agricultural products from regulation and made no
mention of interest rates or dividends.'
The Order created the Cost of Living Council and delegated to it all
1
 Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, P.L. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (Aug. 15, 1970).
The Act has been amended by the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971,
P.L. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743 (Dec. 22, 1971). The swift and almost daily changes in the
regulations require the use of secondary sources for citation purposes. The Commerce
Clearing House publications, Economic Controls (EC) and Economic Controls--Stabiliza-
tion Program Guidelines (SPG), have been most helpful. Cost of Living Council (CLC)
regulations appear in Chapter I of Title 6 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1972) and
SPG 11 3511 et seq.; Pay Board regulations (PI3) in Chapter II and SPG 11 3701 et seq.;
regulations of the Price Commission (PC) in Chapter III and SPG J 3901 et seq.; and
Internal Revenue Service regulations in Chapter W and SPG li 4201 et seq.
2 Exec. Order No. 11615, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1971) ; EC 11 8005. The constitutional validity
of the Order was upheld in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, EC
11 9995 at 9865 (D.D.C. 1971), despite the sparseness of standards provided to guide the
President in the use of the authority conferred. The court relied on an "implicit" stan-
dard of "broad fairness," and a legislative admonition to avoid "gross inequities." Id. at
9876-77.
8 The 1971 Amendments, § 203, authorize the President to regulate interest rates and
dividends. However, Exec. Order No. 11627, 3 C.F.R. 223 (1971), EC 11 8010 subjects
them only to voluntary restraints.
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the powers which the • Act bad given to the President. 4 The Order also
provided that anyone who willfully violated it, or any of the regulations
issued under its authority, would be fined up to $5,000 for each
violation,° and would be subject to appropriate injunctive relief .°
Phase II was born on November 14, 1971. It was conceived by
Executive Order No. 11627. 7
 This Order created a Pay Board made
up of fifteen members, five each from the general public, business and
organized labor,' and a Price Commission composed of seven public
members.° The Order was subsequently confirmed and refined by
Executive Order No. 11640, 10
 which was issued on December 22, 1971,
4 Exec. Order No. 11615, 3 C.F,R. 199 (1971), The Cost of Living Council delegated
administrative authority to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP).
CLC Order No. 1, 36 Fed. Reg. 16215 (1971). Further, the CLC delegated certain ad-
ministrative functions to the Secretary of the Treasury. CLC Order No. 5, 36 Fed. Reg.
21798 (1971); SPG If 4307. The Treasury Department then redelegated this authority
to the Internal Revenue Service. Treasury Department Order No. 150-76, 36 Fed. Reg.
22188 (1971); SPG If 4312. The CLC, while preserving its overall authority, assigned
wage responsibility to the Pay Board and price responsibility to the Price Commission.
CLC Order No. 3, 36 Fed. Reg. 20202 (1971), SPG If 4303; CLC Order No. 4, 36 Fed.
Reg. 20202 (1971), SPG If 4305.
Exec. Order No. 11627, supra note 3, which inaugurated Phase II, created a number
of committees: Committee on Interest and Dividends, Committee on the Health Services
Industry and the Committee on State and Local Government Cooperation. 3 C.F.R. 219
(1971); EC if 8010.05. Superimposed over the above framework are the various executive
agencies with existing responsibility over regulated industries who must now coordinate
with the economic control'agencies. See SPG 1111 4322-4531.
5 Section 204 of the 1970 Act provided that "Fwlhoever willfully violates any order
or regulation under this title shall be fined not more than $5,000." The words "for each
violation" made their first appearance in Exec. Order No. 11615, apparently without any
statutory authority. 3 C.F.R. 201 (1971), EC 11 8005.40. The issue has been mooted by
§ 208 of the 1971 Amendments which provides for civil penalties ($2,500) and criminal
penalties ($5,000) "for each violation." The Price Commission has construed this to mean
that the penalty can be imposed "for each day" of violation. See SPG 971.15. In the
unlikely event this construction can be sustained, it will be used more as a threat than
anything else. Experience with executive administrative personnel indicates that the Gov-
ernment will be reasonable.
6 Act, § 209; SPG if 4623.
7 Exec. Order No. 11627, 3 C.F.R. 222 (1971).
8 Exec. Order No. 11627, § 7(b), 3 C.F.R. 222 (1971), EC If 8010. Most of the labor
members have since departed. See statement by Mr. Meany on April 25, 1972, delivered
before the Joint Economic Committee protesting the increase in food prices accompanied
by the restriction in wages. AFL-CIO Release, May 20, 1972; EC ¶ 9940.05. The political
furor over the failure to control food prices cannot be discounted in predicting changes in
the regulations. It is significant, in an election year, that the exclusion from regulation of
raw agricultural products originated not in Congress but in Exec. Order No. 11615 which
initiated Phase I. 3 C.F.R. 199 (1971); EC I1 8005.10. It will not help much to regulate
the supermarkets because they can increase prices based on allowable costs (subject to
profit margin restrictions) which include higher farm prices. But an attempt to regulate
food prices at their source will be difficult at best, politically impossible at worst.
9 Exec. Order No. 11627, {1 8(a), 3 C.F.R. 222 (1971), EC If 8010.45. The Order
also established some specialized Committees (Interest and Dividends, Health Services
Industry, State and Local Government Cooperation, Rent Advisory Board) and con-
firmed the existence of a Construction Industry Stabilization Committee.
10 37 Fed. Reg. 1213 (1972); SPG if 4702.
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concurrently with the President's signing of the 1971 amendments to
the original Act. The 1971 amendments evidenced congressional dis-
satisfaction with some of the myriad regulations which the newly-
created agencies had issued during the ninety-day freeze to implement
the President's original order of August 15, 1971. The amendments,
effective as of December 21, 1971, not only struck down certain regu-
lations but also introduced new provisions."
The original Act had failed to establish standards to guide the
President in the exercise of his authority to stabilize the economy.
The amended Act (which expires on April 30, 1973, except for actions
then pending) purports to furnish the necessary standards, although
it does so in such vague terms as to add little that the due process
clause has not already impliedly furnished. Thus, among other things,
the President was directed to be "fair and equitable," and to prevent
"gross inequities.". The standards called "for generally comparable
`sacrifices by business and labor as well as other segments of the
economy."" Of more practical significance, the amendments' (a) pro-
hibited the President from reducing wages and benefits which had
been 'scheduled to go into effect before or after November 13, 1971,
under an employment contract executed, or pay practice established,
prior to August 15, 1971," subject only to a finding that the retroactive
payments would 'not be "unreasonably inconsistent" with the wage
and salary standards; and (b) required the President to order the
payment of wage and benefit increases (scheduled under a contract
or practice) which had been held up because of the freeze, unless
"unreasonably inconsistent" with `the wage and salary standards. 14 ' In
other words, Congress restored to employees anything they had lost
because of the freeze, if called for by law or contract prior to August
15, 1971, or if the employer had increased prices or taken other action
based on the wage commitment.'
11 Both the 1970 Act and the 1971 Amendments prohibited reduction of wage, price
and rent levels (with an exception for windfall profits) below those prevailing on May
25, 1970. Act, 203(a) (1) ; SPG 11 4617.
12 Act, 203(b) (5) ; SPG lf 4617.
13 Act, I 203(c) (1) ; SPG 'a 4617. This prohibition was made subject only to a find-
ing that the retroactive payments would not be "unreasonably inconsistent" with the wage
and salary standards. Id.
14 Act, 0 203(c) (2) ; SPG 1 4617.
13 Act, §§ 203(c) (3)(A), (B); SPG 11 4617. The Pay Board has decided that the
retroactivity increases in excess of 7% would be "unreasonably inconsistent" with its stan-
dards, but will permit such excess if the company reports them and no one challenges them
within fourteen days. 6 C.F.R. 201.13(b) (1) (4) (i) (1972) ; SPG ff 3728.10. "Base com-
pensation," on which the retroactive percentage is to be calculated, is the average cost of
wages, salaries and benefits per man hour for the appropriate employee unit on the day
before the payment is to be made. 6 C.F.R. § 201.13(b) (1) (4) (ii) (1972); SPG 11 3728.10.
Retroactivity increases, if otherwise permissible, may be paid immediately, if less than 7%.
6 C.F.R. § 201.13(a) (1972); SPG 11 3728.10. Special provisions govern one-time benefits
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The Act excludes from the definition of "wages and salaries"
employer contributions to pension, profit sharing, or annuity and sav-
ings plans which qualify under appropriate provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code," any group insurance plan or any disability and health
plan."
The Act prohibits limitation on increases for those earning "sub-
standard" wages, or who are members of the "working poor," at least
until such time as they are no longer in those categories." Moreover,
no wage increase can be denied if it is otherwise required by the Fair
Labor Standards Act" or is to be paid under existing or newly estab-
lished incentive programs designed to reflect increases in employee
productivity."
The Act provides for a civil penalty of not more than $2,500 for
each violation. Further, criminal penalties not to exceed $5,000 (again
for each violation) may be imposed on willful violators." As an addi-
tional remedy, the agencies can ask the Attorney General to seek
temporary or permanent injunctive relief in the appropriate federal
district court, where restitution of moneys wrongfully received may be
ordered."
Private actions are also authorized. Any "person suffering legal
wrong" by reason of a violation of the Act, the orders or the regulations
may sue in federal court, without regard to the amount in controversy,
either for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or damages, or for
all three." If the action is against a landlord, or a seller of goods or
such as a frozen increase in life insurance benefits. 6 C.F.R. 	 201.13(b) (1972) ; SPG
1 3728.10. Accrued interest on retroactive obligations may be paid. SPG 11 1731.15.
16 Specifically, the exemption applies to plans treated in Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 401(a), 403(b) and 404(a).
IT Act, § 203(g); SPG 11 4617. The Board has fixed the limits for these "qualified
benefit plans" above which the payments would be "unreasonably inconsistent." Disability
and health plan contributions by an employer may be subject to regulation if the Pres-
ident determines that they are "unreasonably inconsistent" with the general standards
issued by him for wages. Act, § 203(g)(3); SPG 4617,
18 Act, § 203(d) ; SPG 11 4617; 6 C.F.R. 1 201.13(g) (1972); SPG 1I 3728.35.
10 Act, § 203(0(1); SPG 11 4617. Further, wage increases cannot be denied if (a)
required by executive agency wage determinations for work performed under contracts
carried out with federal assistance or (b) performed by alien immigrants temporarily
admitted into the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 37 Fed. Reg.
7615, 7620 (1972); SPG 3733F.35.
20 Act, § 203(f)(3) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 3357, 3361 (1972); SPG 11 3745. The Price Com-
mission, not the Pay Board, has finally implemented a productivity regulation. 37 Fed.
Reg. 8941 (1972); SPG 11 3906A.
21 Act, I 208; SPG 11 4622. Information submitted to the various agencies which
relates to trade secrets or other matters referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) is to be
treated as confidential. Act, § 205; SPG II 4619. The agency heads are given broad sub-
poena powers to compel attendance of witnesses and production of records. Act, § 206;
SPG 11 4620.
22 Act, § 209; SPG 11 4623.
23 Act, § 210(a); SPG 11 4624.
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services, the plaintiff may recover, at the court's discretion, reasonable
attorney's fees and costs, plus the greater of
(a) not more than three times the overcharge, or
(b) not less than $100 or more than $1,000,
provided, however, that if the defendant can establish that the over-
charge was not intentional, and resulted from a bona fide error despite
his maintenance of procedures reasonably designed to avoid such
errors, then the plaintiff can recover only the amount of the over-
charge." Further, except where the overcharge is willful the plaintiff
cannot recover unless' he has demanded a refund of the overcharge and
has not been paid within ninety days of the demand. 25
 "Overcharge" is
defined to mean the amount charged in excess of the ceiling fixed by
the regulations."
The federal district courts are given exclusive jurisdiction of cases
arising under the Act.' Appeals from district court decisions lie ex-
clusively in a newly created Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals,
which, with one important qualification, is granted the powers of a
Circuit Court of Appeals." The Act provides that the Emergency
Court is deprived of power to issue interlocutory decrees "staying or
restraining in whole or in part any provision of this title, or the
effectiveness of any regulation or order issued thereunder."29 Similarly,
the district court is deprived of its customary power to grant interlocu-
tory relief to stay enforcement of a regulation it considers unlawful,
except with regard to a party before it," and then only for the same
reasons which authorize the Emergency Court to invalidate the regu-
lations and orders. If a district court concludes that a substantial con-
stitutional question exists, the question must be certified to the
24 Act, § 210(b); SPG 1f 4624. The section is ambiguous. It is not dear in a case of
an unintentional overcharge whether the plaintiff can nevertheless recover reasonable
attorney's fees. If attorney's fees are recoverable in such cases there will be more than
enough private plaintiffs to enforce the Act. In any case, the award of attorney's fees is
discretionary with the court. There is no provision entitling a defendant to recover at-
torney's fees, regardless of outcome.
25 Act, § 210(b)(2); SPG 11 4624.
20 Act, § 210(c); SPG 1 4624.
27 Act, § 211(a); SPG If 4625. State courts may, however, consider a defense based
on the Act or the regulations, unless such defense questions the constitutionality of the Act
or the validity of the regulations, in which event removal by either party to a federal court
is permitted. Thus, a tenant may plead a regulation to resist a landlord's state action to
evict, or a buyer may plead a regulation as a defense to a seller's suit in state court for
breach of contract. Id.
28 Act, §§ 211(b)(1), (2); SPG if 4625.
20 Act, { 211(b)(1);'SPG Q 4625.
30 Act, § 211(c) (1) ; SPG 11 4625.
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Emergency Court.' A regulation can be set aside by the Emergency
Court only after final judgment, and then only if the regulation is
(a) in excess of the agency's authority, or
(b) arbitrary or capricious, or
(c) otherwise unlawful under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)."
An agency order can be set aside by the Emergency Court only after
final judgment and then only if the order is in excess of the agency's
authority or is based upon findings which are not supported by sub-
stantial evidence." Appeals from interlocutory decisions of district
courts may be taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) to the Emergency
Court." Further appeal rests on the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court."
This brief summary of the Act indicates that Congress has decided
to give the regulatory agencies in this area practically unlimited dis-
cretion. The vagueness of the standards furnished, coupled with the
prohibition against temporary restraints by the district courts, consti-
tutes a grant of immense power to the new agencies. The authority of
the agencies to fashion exceptions, the relative immunity of agency
determinations from effective judicial supervision, and the complexity
of the regulations themselves suggest that the public can merely hope
that the power thus conferred will not be abused. The lawyer's role
becomes a limited one. It is to make a good faith attempt to understand
the letter of the regulations and, where a client is affected by their
application, to seek relief either by way of persuading the agency that
an inequity will result, or to seek special treatment, which is well
within the agency's authority to grant. It is foreseeable that the. rules
will become pockmarked with exceptions, because virtually all powers
have been entrusted to the regulatory discretion of the agencies. We
turn now to the manner in which the broad discretionary powers have
been exercised thus far.
II. THE REGULATIONS
A. Wages and Salaries"
1. 5.5%
Effective on and after November 14, 1971, the maximum allow-
81 Act, § 211(c); SPG ff 4625.
a2 Act, § 211(d)(1); SPG 11 4625.
33 Act, § 211(d)(1); SPG 11 4625.
84 Act, § 211(d)(2); SPG II 4625.
35 Act, § 211(g); SPG II 4625.
36 "Wages and salaries" are broadly defined to cover all direct and indirect renumera-
Lion "reasonably subject to valuation." The term includes, among other items, vacation
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able wage and salary increase is fixed at 5.5%." Before refinement,
qualifications, exceptions and explanations, this "general wage and
salary standard" means that an employees is. forbidden to pay, and
employees are forbidden to receive, an increase of more than 5.5% of
the wage or salary he was being paid on November 13, 1971. Upon
examination, however, an employer can lawfully double (to pick a
figure) an employee's salary if he wishes. Thus, on November 4, 1971,
the Pay Board approved a rate hike of 16.8% under the bituminous
coal agreement on the ground that it was not unreasonably inconsistent
with the wage criteria previously established. On January 13, 1972, the
Board approved an 8.3% increase for aerospace employees."
The reason an employee may lawfully receive a large salary
increase is that the 5.5% limitation applies to an appropriate employee
unit, and not to an individual employee. "Appropriate employee unit"
is a term of
who
 in the labor field. 4° Essentially, it refers to a group of
employees ho perform the same kind of work.n It is the total wages of
that group to which the 5.5% applies.' If some employees in the group
and holiday pay, severance pay, insurance contributions (except for social security and
public retirement plans), deferred compensation, bonuses, payments in kind, tuition re-
fund programs, cost-of-living allowances, and increased pay resulting from less work. 36
Fed. Reg. 21790 (1971); SPG 11 3724.35. An increase in income because of increased
overtime, if bona fide, is not counted if the overtime rate is not increased. Economic
Stabilization Q & A's, No. 8, Feb. 1, 1972; SPG 1f 1651.
87 6 C.F.R. § 201.10 (1972); SPG 11 3725.
88 "Employer" is a firm which employs one or more persons who receive a wage or
salary. 6 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1972); SPG 11 3513.20. "Firm" means a person or any entity,
however organized, including estates, trusts, joint ventures, charitable and educational hi-
stitutions, and the federal, state and local governments. 6 C.F.R. § 1012 (1972); SPG
If 3513.35.
89 EC lf 9980. The inequity of uneven enforcement is hard to justify but even
harder to assail because of the vagueness of the standards and the ability of any compe-
tent administrator to rationalize and articulate good reasons for a different result. In
the aerospace agreement the Board relied on the necessity "to prevent gross inequities
and to preserve the equitable position of the employees involved." That kind of
specificity warms the skeptic's heart. The facts of political life are that the 5.5% limit
has been and will continue to be ignored by the Pay Board if enough pressure is exerted.
One would think that students of constitutional law would whet their conceptual knives
over this issue.
49 The regulations clearly state that the "employee unit" in a given employment
setting shall be recognized so as to conform with the historical and contractual relation-
ships in that setting. 6 C.F.R. § 201.3 (1972); SPG 1f 3724.04. Generally recognized labor
groupings include production and maintenance, skilled craftsmen, clericals, salesmen,
executives, truck drivers, professionals, and guards.
41 Appropriate units of employees will be recognized so as to preserve "contractual
or historical wage and salary relationships." 6 C.F.R. § 201.3 (1972); SPG 11 . 3724.04;
see also SPG 11 1421.10., Duties usually determine their description, but they may be
plant-wide, company-wide or even industry-wide. Administratively, the Pay Board
will probably recognize as one unit the employees covered by a particular labor agree-
ment.
42 The Pay Board has established computation rules for pay adjustments in appro-
priate units. 37 Fed. Reg. 7615, 7616 (1972); SPG 11 3733. The formula includes: (a) the
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receive no increase, the amount which they could have received remains
in the pool from which the others may draw." The 5.5%, to be ac-
curate, is the "maximum permissible annual aggregate wage and salary
increase," "aggregate" referring to the appropriate employee unit.'"
But there are exceptions. The standard can be exceeded if the
employee unit can show that another group, in a "tandem relationship"
with them, got a greater increase." Thus, unorganized clericals, who
usually receive an increase after their organized brothers get one, are
entitled to what their brothers obtained even if this increase exceeds
5.5%, so long as it does not exceed 7%. If an employer can show that
he has to increase wages by more than 5.5% to attract and retain
"essential employees," which he has been losing, the increase can go
up to 7%." If an employer has increased wages in each of the last
three years by less than 7%, he can "catch up," by adding to the
5.5% the percentage difference in each year between the 7% and
what he actually paid, to determine the lawful maximum increase for
the next twelve months, which may not exceed 7%." An employer can
utilize all of these exceptions, but cannot cumulate them beyond 7%."
In some situations he must secure prior approval (tandem relationships
and essential employees), whereas catch-up increases (and calculation
contract year (generally either November 14, 1971, to November 13, 1972, or the labor
agreement year), (b) the base compensation rate (average rate of pay stated in dollars
and cents per hour which is equal to the sum, of): (c) the average straight time hourly
rate and (d) the average hourly benefit rate. "Base date" is the day prior to the first
day of the control year. 37 Fed. Reg. 7615, 7616 (1972); SPG 11 3724.06. "Base year"
is the'twelve-month period ending on the base date. 37 Fed. Reg. 7615, 7616 (1972); SPG
§ 3724.08.
40 Since the 5.5% applies to "wages and salaries" which have been defined to include
practically all employment benefits, an employer must determine the value of each
benefit. For example, an employer can improve the vacations but the value of the im-
provement must be included in the 5.5%. Fringe benefits, because of their exclusion
from wages and salaries in { 203(g) of the Act, are given special treatment. 37 C.F.R.
7615, 7620 (1972); SPG 11 3733G. See note 51 infra.
44 6 C.F.R. 4 201.10 (1972); SPG § 3725. The 5.5% refers to a twelve-month period.
In the case of a labor agreement, the period begins on its effective date. Where there is
no labor agreement, the twelve months begin on November 14, 1971. See SPG § 1421.
45 6 C.F.R. # 201.11(a)(1) (1972); SPG 11 3726.10: The Pay Board has defined
"tandem relationship" as:
[A] well established and consistently maintained practice whereby the precise
timing, amount and nature of general increases in wages and salaries of a
given appropriate employee unit have so followed those of another such unit
of employees of the same employer or of other employers within a commonly
recognized industry (such , as the Standard Industrial Classification two-digit
category) that a general increase, in the normal operation of the practice, would
have been put into effect and have been applicable to work performed on or
before November 13, 1971, but for the operation of the freeze.
6 C.F.R. § 201.3 (1972); SPG 11 3724.30.
45 6 C.F.R. § 201.11(a)(2)(b) (1972); SPG 11 3726.15.
47 6 C.F.R. § 201.11(a)(3) (1972); SPG 11 3726.20.
45 6 C.F.R. § 201.11(b) (1972); SPG 11 3726.30.
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of a cost of living allowance) can be implemented unilaterally by Cate-
gory II and III employers (those with less than 5,000 employees) if
followed by a report to the Pay Board." If the Board desires, it can
approve increases of even more than 7% by resort to "additional cri-
teria" for exceptions which include ongoing collective bargaining, the
equitable position of the employees involved, the fostering of economic
growth, and other facts of like particularity."
What does this mean practically? Under the general standard,
employers confronted with unions are given a powerful weapon to
resist demands in excess of 5.5%. "We have no choice but to abide by
the law" will be heard from employers in negotiating rooms through-
out the land. Just as piedictable is the response: "Give us what we
want and we will submit it to the Pay Board for approval.' More-
over, union demands for fringe benefits, such as pensions and insur-
ance, will escalate dramatically because the cost of such benefits is not
entirely included in "wages and salaries." 52 If the employees are un-
49
 6 C.F.R. § 201.11(c) (1972); SPG II 3726.35.
50
 6 C.F.R. § 201.11(d) (1972); SPG 11 3726.40.
51
 Suppose a union strikes to enforce a wage demand which unlawfully exceeds the
regulatory limits. A strike in support of this unlawful demand might constitute an unfair
labor practice under § 8(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970). Does
the possibility of a Pay Board exception immunize what would otherwise be illegal? May
an employer who bows to the demand plead the strike as a defense to an action by the
Attorney General for criminal violation of the regulations? Suppose a union demands that
an employer escrow the difference between what the employer agreed to and what the
Pay Board allows, to await the potential lifting of controls? See 37 Fed. Reg. 9350 (1972),
SPG 1f 1801.15; 37 Fed. Reg. 7996 (1972), SPG 11 1451.10; 37 Fed. Reg. 2893 (1972),
SPG 1f 1461.05; 37 Fed. Reg. 9350 (1972), SPG lf 1461.05; PB Release 48, Feb. 9, 1972,
SPG 1f 1461.25, May an employer under strike pressure agree to an unlawful wage demand
and then renege, prior to a Pay Board determination? Union officers, because of the Pay
Board's relaxation of the 5.5% limit in a number of large agreements, have little choice
politically but to demand and strike for wages in excess of the standards. Management
negotiators, on the other hand, would be ill-advised to agree to an exorbitant pay settle-
ment in the hope that the Pay Board will reduce it. It amounts to an abdication of man-
agement responsibility which, except for companies in extrentis, is unwise. Moreover, the
Pay Board need not reduce the settlement in which event the company may become non-
competitive. Also, and this is critical, the Price Commission has decided not to permit as
"allowable costs" an amount agreed to in excess of the wage regulations even though the
Pay Board approves it. SPG 1i 445.15. Further, the IRS has indicated it will disallow
business deductions for wages (and prices) paid in excess of the ceilings, on the theory
that any unlawful payment is nondeductible. Rev. Rul, 72-236, 1972-20 Cum. Bull. 7,
EC 9929. The Ruling seems to be limited to willful violations.
52 Fringe benefits: the exclUsion from "wages and salaries" of the employer contribu-
tions for qualified pension, profit sharing and savings plans, group insurance and disability
and health plans (Act, § 203(g); SPG 4617) is subject to modification by the President
(and therefore the Pay Board) if he deems the contributions unreasonably inconsistent
with the established wage and price standards. Act, § 203(g) (3) ; SPG If 4617. The Board
has concluded that an increase in "fringes" of 0.7% of the unit's base compensation rate,
as defined in 37 Fed. Reg. 7615, 7616 (1972) (including the exempted fringes), will not
count as part of the 5.5%. There are exceptions to this, including one which says that
the employer can choose to pay fringes to a value of 5% of the base compensation rate if
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organized, the effect will be to limit their increase to 5.5% overall, or
probably slightly more because of exceptions and the inevitable corner-
cutting. The employer must calculate the annual wages he was paying
as of November 13, 1971, to the appropriate unit of employees (ad-
justed for changes in the unit) and may grant increases, if he wants
to, of not more than 5.5% of that amount for the following twelve
months. There is no limit on the frequency of such increases so long
as the sum of the percentage increases does not exceed 5.5% over the
twelve-month period.53 He can improve the pension and insurance
fringes without regard to the 5.5%, and, as noted, he can pay more
than 5.5% to some of the group so long as others receive proportion-
ately less.
Nothing is that simple, of course. An employer may promote an
employee, and pay him the salary called for by the new job, without
regard to the 5.5% limitation. The pay follows the job, not the per-
son." Longevity increases, and automatic progressions within rate
ranges, if paid under well-established practices, can be granted with-
out regard to the 5.5%." Labor agreements, employment contracts or
pay practices in effect prior to November 14, 1971, may continue to
operate according to their respective terms, unless challenged by the
Pay Board." With regard to merit increases, the Pay Board has run
a zigzag pattern. As of this writing, it has been decided that, under
labor agreements, merit increases may be granted within rate ranges
without regard to the 5.5% standard." In the absence of a labor agree-
ment, the employer may grant merit increases only up to 5.5%. This
distinction will not escape the attention of union organizers. The pre-
sumed basis for it is that unfettered employers could grant practically
any desired increase simply by attaching a merit label to it.
There are special provisions governing bonuses. They may still
be granted, but are to be included within the allowable 5.5% increase,
except that if paid pursuant to established bonus plans," the 5.5%
figure may be disregarded as to those dollar amounts which do not ex-
ceed by more than 5.5% the bonus dollars paid to an appropriate unit
in doing so his total contributions for fringes does not exceed 10% of the base compen-
sation rate. See 37 Fed. Reg. 7615, 7620 (1972) ; SPG 1111 1541, 37330.20.
63 SPG if 1421.15.
54 37 Fed. Reg. 7615, 7619 (1972); SPG 11 3733F.10. There appear to be no restric-
tions on what an employer may pay a new employee. However, the new employer will
have to include the employee within the appropriate unit.
55 37 Fed. Reg. 7615, 7619 (1972); SPG 1111 1621, 3733F.15.
56 6 C.P.A. § 201.14 (1972); SPG if 3729.
57 6 C.F.R. § 201.14 (1972); SPG 11 3729.15.
58 6 C.F.R. § 201.74 (1972); SPG 11 3739. In order to qualify as an "established"
bonus plan, payments must have been granted under the plan during any one of the three
years ending Nov. 14, 1971. 6 C.F.R. § 201.74(a) (1) (1972); SPG 11 3739.05.
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in any one of' such three preceding fiscal years." As expected, there are
special rules for executive employees paid under variable compensation
plans, although they too are generally subject to 5.5% limits." Essen-
tially, an employer niay continue to apply the variable formula (except
for stock -options) 61 as set forth in an established written plan and
may pay the resulting amounts so long as they do not exceed the highest
annual amount paid during any of the three fiscal years ending prior, to
November 14, 1971, plus 5.5%. The same general rules apply where
the employer has no written plan, but has followed an established prac-
tice (two of the last three fiscal years ending prior to November 14,
1971) of compensating employees on a variable basis. Sales incentives;
commission and production incentive plans (which do not include in-
centives based on profits) may continue to operate in accordance with
their 'terms, if such plans were in effect before November 14, 1971,
even if the income to be paid thereunder exceeds the 5.5% standard."
New incentive plans may be adopted only with the prior approval of
the Pay Board and then only if the administration of such plan does
not increase the employees' aggregate incentive compensation." Greater
productivity resulting' in greater income to the employer is not barred.
But an employer cannot alter the method of calculating the rate of.com-
pensation without infringing upon the 5.5% limit."
2. Coverage, Exemptions and Exceptions
The Act covers only "prices, rents, wages and salaries." The Cost
of Living Council has decided that these terms do not include
(a) state and local income, sales and real estate taxes;
(b) workmen's compensation payments;
"	 59 .6 , C.F.R. § 201.74 (1972); SPG ll 3739. •
go 6 C.F.R. § 201.74 (1972), SPG 11 3739; 6 C.F.R. § 201.75 (1972), SPG 3740.
61
 If a stock option plan was established before November 14, 1971, the recipient
may exercise options granted prior to December 16, 1971. With regard to new options
under the'plan, they may be gianted and exercised if (a) the plan was approved by the
stockholders, (b) it stipulates the maximum number of shares to be made available, (c)
the option price is not less than 100% of the fair market value on the date of grant, (d)
the plan is administered in accordance with past practice, and (e) the aggregate number
of shares made available does not exceed the average number of shares made available
annually during the three years between August 15, 1968, and August 15, 1971, or the
average number of shares made available annually during the existence of a plan estab-
lished after•August 15, 1968. 6 C.F.R. § 201.76 (1972); SPG 11 3742.05.
02 6 C.F.R. § 201.77(a) (1972); SPG if 3742.05.
es 6 C.F.R. § 201.77(b) (1972); SPG 11 3742.10.
64 6 C.F.R. § 201.78 (1972); SPG g 3743. New companies, that is, those enterprises
established after November 14, 1971, may inaugurate incentive or variable compensation
programs for their salesmen or executives provided that they repiirt to the Pay Board
and deMonstrate that in all respects the plan was not adopted for the purpose of circum-
venting the wage stabilization program. The Board can disapprove the plan if it finds it
unreasonably inconsistent with its policies. 6 C.F.R. § 201.79 (1972); SPG 1i 3744.
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(c) welfare payments;
(d) child support payments; or
(e) alimony payments."
Beyond that, there can be other exemptions (a general regulatory
waiver of a class otherwise included)" and exceptions (a specific
waiver in a particular case)." Thus, exempt from the 5.5% restric-
tion are the "working poor," which as of this date refers to employees
earning less than $2.75 an hour (until increases bring them up to that
rate)." Pay increases required by the federal minimum wage laws are
also exempt." Government employees (except postal workers) and
American employees working abroad are exempt, as are employees
working in Puerto Rico and other outlying possessions, but not em-
ployees of foreign corporations." Wage increases resulting from ex-
isting or new incentive programs, designed to reflect directly increases
in employee productivity, are also exempt 11
The Cost of Living Council has exempted the "small business"
from both wage and price controls. The term "small business" cur-
rently means an enterprise with sixty or fewer employees (with qual-
ifications if 50% of those employees are covered by master labor
agreements whith themselves cover more than sixty employees). To
be eligible for the exemption the employing firm must have had an
average of sixty or fewer employees in the four quarterly pay periods
beginning with the one including June 30, 1971." Firms established
after December 31, 1971 compute the average number of employees
by looking to later calendar quarters. The exemption does not apply
to (a) firms with annual revenues of $50 million or more, (b) institu-
05 6 C.F.R. § 101.1(c) (1972); SPG 3512.15.
00 6 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1972); SPG 1 3513.30.
07
 6 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1972); SPG 11 3513.25. Requests for exceptions generally must be
made in the first instance to the local IRS office. Treas. Reg. 401.302; SPG 1 595.40.05.
08 37 Fed. Reg. 14998 (1972) ; SPG glE 1631, 3542.
69 37 Fed. Reg. 7615, 7619 (1972); SPG 3733F.30. An employee earning the cur-
rent federal minimum wage ($1.60) who gets an increase not required by the Fair Labor
Standards Act apparently must include such increase for 5.5% purposes. This seems in-
consistent with the ruling which states that wages of employees earning less than $2.75
per hour can be increased without regard to 5.5% until the rate reaches $2.75.
70 6 C.F.R. 101.35 (1972); SPG 11 3532.
71 Section 203(0(3) of the Act states that payments of any increase "in conjunc-
tion with existing or newly-established employee incentive programs which are designed
to reflect directly increases in employee productivity" shall not be precluded. This may
be intended to cover only piecework incentive' plans usually associated with hourly
workers. But conceivably the language would also cover variable compensation plans for
executives (who are also spurred to greater productivity by more money) which are pres-
ently subject to a 5.5% restriction. The words "to reflect directly," on the other hand,
may restrict the section to piecework and similar incentive plans. Sec SPG 1601.
72 This exemption is available only to firms in existence prior to Jan. 1, 1972. 37
Fed. Reg. 8939, 8940 (1972); SPG ¶ 3535.
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tional and non-institutional providers of health services (doctors, den-
tists, hospitals et al.), or (c) construction firms. The small business
exemption is a significant one."
B. Prices
One need not be an economist to know that the erosion of a mon-
etary unit is a complex function of costs, wages and profit levels, all
immersed in a solution whose ingredients include international trade,
supply, demand and the comparative strength of the nation. There are
as many theories regarding inflation as there are commentators who
presume to know about it. It would be nonsense, for example, to limit
wages without putting a ceiling on prices, even if it were politically
feasible, as it would be equally so to restrain prices without containing
the wages and costs in which they are rooted. In this context, wages,
costs, prices and profits are different words to describe the same thing.
The real issue is the short-run distribution of the fruits of production
among politically definable groups.
The administration of a wage program is simple compared to the
fixing of price levels. The truth of this is exhibited by a comparison
of the regulations. Whereas wage increases are to be calculated ac-
cording to a 5.5% limit, with the exceptions hereinbefore noted, prices
are to be controlled by a formula whose components include allowable
costs, productivity gains and profit margins, all of which escape math-
ematical precision.74
 There are three broad groups to which price reg-
ulations apply: manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers, and service
and professional organizations." Each group is treated differently but
73
 37 Fed. Reg. 8939, 8940 (1972); SPG If 3535.05. Affected by the exemption are
five million small firms and local governments, approximating $500 billion in annual sales
and nineteen million employees (some of whom were already exempt). It should be em-
phasized that the small business exemption relates to both wages and prices (but not
rents). The Regulation, when first released on May 1, 1972, did not explain whether
affiliated companies would be treated as a single entity for purposes of determining an
average number of employees. A presently maintainable view is that for prices, affiliates
must combine the number of employees whereas for wages they need not. See note 115
infra. •
74 The publicized 2 1A% limit on prices has no application to an individual enterprise.
It is a broad governmental objective to limit the nationwide average price increases to
that figure. No enterprise can be compelled to reduce its prices below those prevailing on
May 25, 1970. Act, § 203(a)(1); SPG 11 4617.
75 6 C.F.R. § 300.11 (1972); SPG lf 3906. Many organizations do not fit neatly into
any category or, at the least, are afforded special treatment. Thus, the Pay Board has
adopted specific regulations for automobile dealers. SPG Ifff 451, 537. The Price Commis-
sion has concluded that advertising firms should be classified as service organizations, not
retailers. Price Commission Q & A's, Jan. 20, 1972; SPG 11 411.05. Doctors and dentists
are treated specially. In addition to the general limitations (allowable costs and profit
margins) the aggregate. price increase levied by a doctor (a non-institutional provider of
health services) cannot exceed 2.5% in the aggregate per year. 6 C.F.R. § 300.19(c)
(1972); SPG 11 3914.15; see also SPG A 585. For hospitals and nursing homes, the limit
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all are subject to the general rule that prices cannot be increased over
the base price except when justified by allowable cost increases and
not even then if the effect of the price boost is to raise the company's
profit margins. Thus,
A manufacturer may charge a price in excess of the base price
only to reflect increases in allowable costs that it incurred
since the last price increase in the item concerned, or that it
incurred after January 1, 1971, whichever was later, and that
it is continuing to incur, reduced to reflect productivity gains,
and only to the extent that the increased price does not result
in an increase in its profit margin over that which prevailed
during the base period."
Before defining the terms, the question arises as to how a manu-
facturer (or other seller of goods or services) is to know, when he sets
his prices, what his eventual profit, margin will be. Profit margins are
tied to sales volume, which is unpredictable. If a manufacturer's esti-
mate of future sales is wrong, a price increase previously set may be
unlawful. May a purchaser seize upon this to offset an overcharge
against future sales, or sue to recover the overcharge? If a manufac-
turer increases prices on January 1, which becomes unlawful on Decem-
ber 31 because of an unanticipated improvement in sales and profit
margins, may he plead an ex post facto defense against civil penalties?
What leeway is to be granted? What advice does the lawyer offer, ex-
cept to cite the regulations? There 'have been practical assurances that
reasonable leeway will be granted. The Phase I freeze achieved its
dramatic effect. The purpose of Phase II is merely to keep the tem-
perature down.
The base price applicable to all three categories for a particular
product or service is the highest price charged to purchasers in a sub-
stantial number of transactions (10%)" during the freeze base period,
i.e., (a) July 16, 1971 to August 14, 1971, or (b) the nearest preced-
ing thirty day period if no transaction occurred during the first pe-
riod." There are qualifications to this for manufacturers, covering
temporary special deals such as discounts and other promotional ar-
is 6%. 6 C.F.R. § 300.18(c)(1) (1972); SPG If 3913. For insurers, see 6 C.F.R. § 300.20
(1972); SPG ¶ 3915. Concerning lawyers, accountants, architects and other professionals,
see 6 C.F.R. § 300.14 (1972); SPG ¶ 3909.
76 6 C.F.R. § 300.12 (1972); SPG 3907.
'77 6 C.F.R. § 300.432 (1972); SPG If. 3935. A "transaction" occurs at the time a
binding contract is entered into. 6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972); SPG lf 3905.81. For the purpose
of determining a lawful price, the transaction must be bona fide and at arm's length. 6
C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972) ; SPG If 3905.81.
78 6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972); SPG If 305.27. There is a substantial difference, of
course, between an allowable percentage markup and a dollar for dollar increase.
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rangements. New products and new services (those not offered during
the preceding twelve, months) must be priced,no higher than the aver-
age price charged for comparable products and services during the
freeze base period." Contracts entered into prior to August 15, 1971,
calling for performance after November 13, 1971, may be carried out
regardless of price, if the seller's resulting prOfit margin is not greater
than that'Of*the base period." For 'retailers and wholesalers, the base
price may be exceeded only, if the customary initial percentage
markup81
 is equal to or less than either the Markups made (a) before
November 14, 1971, or (b) during the last fiscal year ending August
14, 1971, whichever is chosen by the seller; but then only if the aggre-
gate effect of all price changes does not increase the profit margiti over
that of the base period.82 Base period as used here means any two of
the last three fiscal years ending before August 15, 1971, the two years
to be selected by the company. To determine base period profit mar-
gins, the weighted average of the two years chosen is to be used."
Alloivable cost is what the Price Commission says it is. It is de-
fined as "any cost, direct or indirect, unless disallowed by the Com-
mission."" Productivity gains for manufacturers and construction
contractors are calculated for pricing purposes on the basis of the
average precentage gain in the applicable industrial category, which
is set forth in the Standard Industrial Classification, 1967. 85 Profit
margin is defined as
the ratio that operating income (net sales less cost of sales
and less normal and general recurring costs . of business opera-
tions, determined before non-operating items, extraordinary
79
 6 C.F.R. § 300.409(c)(1) (1972); SPG V 3939.15; see also SPG a 451.13..
80. 6 C.F.R. § 300.101 (1972); SPG 3928,
81
 Defined in 6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972), SPG 11 3905.18, as the markup applied to the
retailer's cost (purchase price plus transportation) when first offered for sale determined
on an item, product line, department, store or other, pricing unit basis according to the
retailer's customary practice. See SPG 11 801. Fair trade laws have been overridden, ac-
cording to the Price Commission. 6 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1972); SPG 11 841.75.
82
 6 C.F.R. § 300.12 (1972);•SPG 11 3907. Premarking by a manufacturer does not
release a retailer or wholesaler from compliance responsibility. SPG V 461.10. Retailers
with revenues of less than $200,000 during their last fiscal year are exempt from the
posting requirements, See 6 C.F.R. § 300.13(e) (1972); SPG 3908.25.
83
 6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972); SPG If 3905.06. For profit margin calculation, see SPG
It 1021.
84 6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972); SPG II 3905.03. Allowable costs apply to a particular
product or product line, not to the company as a whole. Economic Stabilization Q & A's,
No. 10, Feb. 9, 1972; SPG ft 445. Overall increases in such costs are to be allocated to
particular products. Allowable costs do not include non-depreciable capital investments.
SPG 1I 837.. Costs to be allowable are limited to those that have occurred on or after
January 1, 1971, or since the last price increase occurring after that date. 6 C.F.R.
§ 300.12, 300.14 (1972); SPG 1111 3907, 3909.
85 6 C.F.R. § 300.11(a) (1972); SPG if 3906A,
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items, and income taxes) bears to net sales as reported on the
person's financial statement prepared in accordance with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles consistently applied."
Firms which have made little or no money during the base period
have been granted relief through special regulations applicable to
"low-profit" concerns. 87 A "low-profit firm" is one which, during its
most recently ended fiscal year (or in an alternative fiscal year ob-
tained by combining the net sales and average total capital, in any two
of the three fiscal years of the base period, and dividing by two) had
(a) net sales of less than $1,000,000 and a profit margin of less than
3% or (b) net sales of $1,000,000 or more but a profit margin cal-
culated on a basis of capital turnover ratios and tabulated in the reg-
ulations. Capital turnover ratios are obtained by dividing the net sales
for the year by the average total capital. "Average total capital" is
obtained by adding the outstanding total capital (long-term debt plus
owner's equity) at the beginning and end of the fiscal year and divid-
ing by two. Firms which satisfy these requirements may increase their
prices (not to exceed 8%) without regard to allowable costs until
their profit margins exceed those which precipitated their classification
as low-profit firms. Certain enterprises, e.g., service organizations,
public utilities, insurers) are excluded from the "low-profit" relief. 88
Many organizations, commodities and transactions have been
completely exempted from price regulation. The list is lengthy and
detailed, ranging from brokerage fees to college tuitions, and from
exports and imports to taxidermists' services. 80 There seems to be no
80 6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972); SPG 3905.60.
87 37 Fed. Reg. 10943 (1972); SPG 11 3917.
88 37 Fed. Reg. 10943-44 (1972); SPG 11 3917. The limit of an 8% price increase to
low- or no-profit firms raises a constitutional issue. Suppose an 8% increase is not enough
to permit break-even operations. The company, after its petition for exception is denied,
may be required to continue a' loss operation which could result in bankruptcy. Is there
any constitutional impediment to this based on confiscation without due process? Thus,
there are situations which would fairly justify more than an 8% increase as the sole means
to preserve an investment and it would be overlooking an argument if constitutional ob-
jections to the 8% limit were not raised.
89 The major areas of exemption are the following:
(a) raw unprocessed agricultural products, including seafood and raw sugar;
(b) handicraft, antiques, art objects, precious stones and mountings therefor, collec-
tors' coins and stamps;
(c) exports, imports (first sale) and international shipping rates;
(d) dues of non-profit organizations;
(e) tuition charged by private non-profit educational institutions;
(f) securities and financial instruments, property subject to net leases as defined in
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 163(d) (4) (A), commercial paper and commodity futures;
(g) retail firms, including restaurants, with sales or revenues of less than $100,000
(but not including "service" firms such as laundries, dry cleaners, restaurants, or repair
shops);
(11) small business firms currently defined as those with sixty or fewer employees;
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unifying factor to explain the nature and scope of the exemptions,
except perhaps to ease the administrative burden.
C. Rents
Broadly speaking, rents are permitted to rise 2Y2 % above the
base rent." Base rent varies according to the lease duration and the
date of occupancy. If the property became occupied between May 25,
1970, and May 15, 1971, on a month-to-month basis, or less, the base
rent is the greater of (a) the monthly rent charged in the rental period
which includes May 25, 1970, plus 5% or (b) the monthly rent charged
for the most recent rental period before May 16, 1971.' If the lease
duration is greater than month-to-month, and if the property was oc-
cupied before May 15, 1971, the base rent computation becomes some-
what more complicated, involving "average transaction rents," "eligible
transactions" and fractions with specific numerators and denomina-
(i) damaged and used goods;
(j) custom services and products made to individual order, including jewelry, leather
goods, wigs, furs, tailoring, picture framing, and taxidermy;
(k) brokerage fees charged for trading on a securities exchange subject to SEC regu-
lations and for over-the-counter transactions if consistent with SEC-certified fee schedules;
(I) royalties and copyrights for materials prepared for publication;
(m) sales of unimproved real estate and real estate with improvements completed
prior to August 15, 1971. If improvements were completed on or after August 15, 1971,
the real estate is still exempt where the sales price is determined after completion of con-
struction or the wage rates are known to the builder and not altered by the Pay Board
after the improvement price is set;
(n) rentals of nonresidential property Including property leased for industrial, farm
or commercial purposes; rental units which are constructed and first offered for rent after
August 15, 1971; rehabilitated dwellings first offered for rent after August 15, 1971, under
certain conditions; single family dwellings and units in owner occupied multi-family
dwellings under certain conditions (and if lessor and family do not have an interest in
more than four of such units); rentals of single and multi-family dwelling units at a
monthly rent of $500 or more on January 19, 1972, or during the base rental period;
rentals under the so-called Baltimore system of real estate land leases;
(o) insurance purchased or renewed after November 13, 1971, including (1) life in-
surance (ordinary, term and group policies, endowments, and fixed or variable annuities)
but excluding credit life insurance; (2) reinsurance; (3) ocean marine insurance; and
(4) certain policies in excess of $100,000 (all other forms of insurance, such as health,
property, and casualty insurance are subject to regulation);
(p) federal, state and local governmental fees, including franchise and license fees,
postal rates, and tuition charged for schools and colleges operated by a state or local
government. However, fees charged by state and local governments for utilities and health
services (including gas, electricity, telephone, telegraph, public transportation by vehicle,
but excluding water and sewage disposal services) are not exempt;
(q) transactions occurring in the insular possessions and territories.
6 C.F.R. 11 101.31-101.36, 101.51 (1972); SPG MI 3529-3533, 3535.
9° 6 C.F.R. § 301.102(a)(1) (1972); SPG 3971.05. The Act, 1 203(h), SPG 1,4617,
provides that neither states nor subdivisions thereof shall be exempt from federal rent
regulation solely because they, regulate rent themselves. The Price Commission's rent regu-
lations in effect let local regulatory agencies determine the lawful increases according to
their own rent control programs. But the Commission has reserved jurisdiction.
91 6 C.F.R. 11 301.203(a), 301.207(a) (1972); SPG tf 3981.
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tors." If the property became occupied between May 16, 1971, and
November 13, 1971, the base rent is the most recent monthly rent
charged during that period regardless of duration. The same rules
apply to property first occupied between November 14, 1971 and
December 28, 1971."
After December 28, 1971, the landlord may charge the base rent,
determined as outlined above, plus
(a) % of the base rent for such property for each twelve-
month period commencing after December 28, 1971 (the
2V2 % may not be accumulated from one period to another
period) plus
(b) the amount of any increase in allowable costs."
"Allowable costs" includes state and local real estate taxes, fees,
levies, and charges for all municipal services, except those for gas and
electricity. Allowable costs do not include special assessments." Pro-
vision is made for allocation of an increase in allowable costs, the
method of allocation, and special adjustments to compensate a land-
lord for an inability to recover for such increases." Rent increases
over the base rent are also permitted where capital improvements have
been made. Formula-determined rentals may continue to be charged
under the formula but the total dollar amount cannot exceed base rent
plus allowable cost increases.° 7
 Seasonal increases are also permitted."
A landlord owning a unit subject to governmental rent controls may
increase the rent beyond the base rent only to the extent authorized
by the rent control authorities which themselves are now under reg-
ulatory review." As in the area of price regulation, exemptions from
rent regulation are provided for specific categories of rental property.'"
92 6 C.F.R. § 301.203(b), 301.206 (1972) ; SPG 11i 3982.10, 3985.
93 6 C.F.R. §§ 301.202, 301.204, 301.205 (1972); SPG 11 3981, 3983-84.
94 6 C.F.R. § 301.102(a) (1972); SPG 3971.05.
05 6 C.F.R. § 301.102(b) (1972); SPG 1 3971.10.
NI Id.
97 6 C.F.R. § 301.104 (1972); SPG 11 3973.
98 6 C.F.R. § 301.105 (1972) ; SPG 1 3974.
99 6 C.F.R. § 301.106 (1972) ; SPG 11 3975. Except where premises are rent-controlled,
a landlord cannot raise rents except upon thirty days notice thereof to the tenant which
notice must contain specific information including, among others, the amount (dollars and
percentage) of the increase, and how calculated. 6 C.F.R. § 301.501 (1972); SPG 3989.
100 The following are exempt from the Phase II rent regulations:
(a) all non-residential property, which includes farm, industrial and commercial
property;
(b) residential rental property on which construction is completed, and offered for
rent for the first time, after August 15, 1971;
(c) rehabilitated dwellings where the cost of rehabilitation is more than one-half of
either the undepreciated cost or the fair market value of the property before the rehabilita-
tion and which is offered for rent for the first time after August 15, 1971;
1295
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
D. Dividends and Interest
Neither the original Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, nor the
President's Executive Order of August 15, 1971, alluded to dividends
or interest. Subsequently, in his Executive Order of October 15, 1971, 101
the President established a Committee on Interest and Dividends whose
duty was to devise and execute a program to obtain voluntary restraint
on interest rates and dividends. This proposal was ratified by Congress
in the 1971. amendments to the Act when the President was authorized
to issue appropriate orders and regulations to stabilize "interest rates
and corporate dividends and similar transfers.'"° 2 The President has
chosen to continue a program of voluntary restraint, and while detailed
regulations have been 'issued by the Committee, there. is no legal com-
pulsion to honor them 1 03
Corporations have been asked to limit their 1972 dividend in-
creases to 4% over the highest total paid during any of. their three
fiscal years ending in 1969, 1970, or 1971, all adjusted for stock divi-
dends and splits.'" If a companyhas paid no dividend in those years,
or if the dividends that it did pay would result in a 1972 dividend of
less than 25% of net income (after taxes and preferred dividends) for
the fiscal year ending in 1971, it may declare cash dividends on com-
mon stock not to exceed 25% of such net income.' 05
 There are special
rules for companies whose dividends for the three fiscal years would
require a 1972 payment which is less than that paid in 1971, and
(d) apartment units renting for $500 per month or more on January 19, 1972, or
during the base period if unoccupied;
(e) owner-occupied dwellings of four or fewer units under leases of greater than
month-to-month duration on January 19, 1972, or during the base period if unoccupied;
(f) single family rental dwellings (where the landlord owns four. units or fewer)
rented for greater than month-to-month duration on January 19, 1972, or during the base
period if unoccupied.
6 C.F.R. § 101.33(2) (1972); SPG	 3530.05.
101 See note 8 supra.
102 Act, § 203; SPG II 4617.
103
 See note 3 supra. The Committee on Interest and Dividends has issued guidelines
which may be found generally in EC flf 7751-7758.
104 Comm. on Interest and Dividends, News Release, Feb. 15, 1972; SPG 9 561.
Exemptions from the dividend guidelines have been provided for the following:
(a) corporations with assets of less than $1,000,000;
(b) corporations with a rlos of common stock held of record by less than five hun-
dred persons;
(c) corporations which are not subject to the reporting requirements under Section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
(d) insurance companies without capital stock;
(e) regulated investment companies, real estate investment trusts or personal holding
companies as defined in Subchapters M and G of the Internal Revenue Code; or
(f) a company 80% or more of whose common stock is owned by a company to
which the guidelines apply.	 ,
Id.
1°5 Id.
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special rules for calculations by merged companies. Companies which
comply with the guidelines will be exempt from the accumulated earn-
ings tax to the extent that the dividends were withheld by reason of
such compliance.1"
The Committee has published no formal regulations on interest
rates. The Cost of Living Council is aware of its authority to do so
but has not yet found it necessary.'
III. REPORTING RULES
A. Wages
There are three categories of employers, each with different re-
porting requirements, based on the number of employees affected by
the intended increase. Category I employers are those with 5,000 or
more affected employees.'" These employers must notify and obtain
Pay Board approval before implementing any increase.'" Category II
employers are defined as those with between 1,000 and 4,999 affected
employees. They may implement a lawful increase but must notify the
Pay Board at the time they do so."° Category III employers, those
with fewer than 1,000 affected employees, may implement a lawful
increase without seeking prior approval and without reporting it to
the Pay Board. They are subject to monitoring and spot checks.'"
B. Prices
Reporting requirements for price increases are determined by the
volume of the firm's activity and its annual sales or revenue. Again,
there are three categories of firms. Category I includes firms with an-
nual sales or revenue of over 100 million dollars, operators of mass
transportation systems, health service institutions with annual sales
or revenues over $10,000 and large construction firms with sales or
revenues of $50 million or more."' These firms must obtain the ap-
proval of the Price Commission before implementing any price in-
crease above the base price."' Insurers become "prenotifiers" at reve-
106 See SPG 11 561.15.
107 See SPG A 777.05.
108 6 C.F.R. § 101.21 (1972); SPG 11 3522.
100 6 C.F.R. § 101.21(a) (1972); SPG 11'3522, State and local government employees
in Category I need not prenotify; those in Category II need not report under certain
circumstances if the wage increases are less than 5.5%, but all categories must secure prior
approval of those in excess of 5.5%. 6 C.F.R. § 101.28 (1972); SPG 11 3525.
110 6 C.F.R. §I I01.23(a),(b) (1972); SPG 11 3523.05. Category II involves 4,000
employee units and about 7% of the work force.
al 6 C.F.R. § 101.25(a) (1972); SPG ¶ 3524. See note 120 infra regarding IRS
audits.
112 6 C.F.R. § 101.11(a) (1972); SPG 3115.05,
In 6 C.F.R. § 101.11(c) (1972); SPG fr 3315.15. See also 6 C.F.R. § 101.16 (1972),
SPG 11 3518, relaxing prenotification requirements for price increases based on raw or
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nues of $250 million or more."' For reporting purposes, parents and
subsidiaries are treated as one firm.' 18 The Commission will decide
whether each segment of a multi-industry firm must prenotify. Pre-
notification companies with many products are subject to the Term
Limit Pricing rule which in substance enables them to increase prices
on a weighted average basis for all product lines up to a maximum of
270. 11 °
Category II includes firms with annual sales or revenues of be-
tween fifty million and one hundred million dollars and certain health
service firms and construction firms not included in Category I. 117
These firms are obligated to file quarterly reports setting forth all price
adjustments.'" They need not obtain approval by the. Commission
before implementing an increase but must not exceed the applicable
ceilings.
Category III includes firms with annual sales and revenue of less
than fifty million dollars. They need neither prenotify nor file periodic
reports." 9
 Their adherence to the regulations will be policed by mon-
itoring and spot checks."'
IV. THE COURTS
There have been a number of actions filed to date both by the
Government seeking to enforce the regulations and by individuals
challenging them. Little more than a month after the freeze went into
effect, the Attorney General sought to enjoin a planned wage increase
for teachers in Louisiana."' The Atlanta Falcons were shortly there-
partially dressed products, price increases below the base price, certain utilities, certain
insurance premium levels, health services, certain leases, multi-product industries, and
certain milk products.
114 6 C.F.R. § 101.16(d) (1972); SPG II 3518.20.
115 6 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1972); SPG 113513.35. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1563(a)
establishing the "80% rule." 6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972), SPG 11 3905.39 (manufacturers);
6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972), SPG 11 3905.69 (retailers); 6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972), SPG
11 3905.78 (service organizations); 6 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1972), SPG 11 3905.90 (wholesalers).
These citations establish that all entities in a corporate or similar group will be combined
and treated as one entity, not only for reporting purposes, but also for pricing purposes
relative to profit margins. Combining affiliated entities for wage purposes is not presently
justified by the CLC or PB regulations. See 6 C.F.R. § 201.3 (1972); SPG 11 3724.04
(appropriate employee units).
110 PC News Release 37, Dec. 22, 1971; SPG 11 1231.101. This figure has recently
been reduced to 1.8%. PC News Release 72, Mar. 23, 1972; SPG 11 1231.105.
117 6 C.F.R. § 101.13(a) (1972); SPG § 3516.05.
118 6 C.F.R. § 101.13(b) (1972); SPG 11 3516.10.
115 6 C.F.R. § 101.15(b) (1972); SPG 11 3517.10.
120 6 C.F.R. § 101.15(b) (1972); SPG 11 3517.10. If the IRS persists in its announced
intention to disallow tax deductibility for wages and prices paid in excess of the ceilings
there will be no need for Price Commission monitoring inasmuch as IRS tax audits would,
in the normal course, pick up the violations.
121 U.S. v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 333 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. La. 1971). The
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after charged with unlawfully increasing the price of football tickets.'"
Private plaintiff suits then began to proliferate. Teachers, professional
football teams, landlords and municipal employees seemed the most
affronted.
Most of the actions initially brought were mooted by the Phase II
retroactivity rulings prompted by the 1971 amendments. The first im-
portant opinion was rendered by the District Court for the District of
Columbia in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally.' Judge Leven-
thal, writing for a three-judge court, upheld the validity of the original
Stabilization Act and the Phase I regulatory action taken thereunder.
The court, noting that "the Rule of Law had been beleaguered but not
breached,'" ruled in substance that the delegation of congressional
power was within permissible constitutional limits and that the legis-
lative standards were sufficient to enable a court to determine whether
the Presidential action was consistent with the legislative will. 125
As of this writing, (May 1972), there have been twenty-one suits
(one criminal) filed by the government, twenty-four filed by private
persons against the government challenging the validity of the stabi-
lization program and certain of its regulations, and one action brought
by a private individual against another.'" Only six have gone to
opinion. The Meat Cutters case is the most significant in terms of a
thorough treatment of the issues. There, the union had sought to en-
join the government from barring, under the authority of Phase I, a
wage increase which had been granted to plaintiff's members prior to
August 15, 1971, but which was to be implemented during the freeze.
The Act and the regulatory scheme were upheld against the union's
contentions of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and
impairment of contracts.'" The court exhaustively reviewed the dele-
gation argument and concluded that the standards furnished by Con-
gress to the President (in the original Act adopted in 1970) were
constitutionally adequate.'" The court looked to the legislative history
motion for injunction was denied because the court found that the teacher salary increases
were not subject to the provisions of Exec. Order No. 11615. Id. at 422.
122 Suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia on Sept. 27, 1971. EC ¶ 9998(3).
128 337 F. Supp. 737, EC 9995 at 9865 (D.D.C. 1971).
124 Id. at 755, EC if 9995 at 9875.
125 Id, at 763, EC ¶ 9995 at 9882. In Letter Carriers v. Postal Service, 333 F. Supp.
566 (D.D.C. 1971), the court ruled that the Act applied to government employees despite
the absence of specific language to that effect. See Huber v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 507,
EC 11 9975 at 9830 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (construing and upholding rent ceiling regulations
as against the challenge that the use of different standards for rent than for other prices
violated due process clause on equal protection grounds).
120 See EC at 9051-55.
127 337 F. Supp. at 743, EC 11 9995 at 9867,
128 Id. at 746-47, EC 1 9995 at 9868-69.
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of the Act to discern the underlying Congressional purpose which, had
the Act contained clear and explicit standards, would have been un-
necessary. It would not be useful here to analyze the Meat Cutters
opinion because the amendments to the Act have mooted the argu-
ments about inadequate standards even though, as a practical mat-
ter, the amendments furnish no more meaningful standards than did
the original Act, which provided virtually none at all. It is enough to
say that the opinion is an exercise in careful legal scholarship with
little relevance to the overriding issue of how to control inflation.
Courts need not challenge Congress or the President head on to
reach a desired result. In United States v. Jefferson Parish School
Board,'" the court dismissed the government's application for an in-
junction against a school board's implementation of a pay increase for
teachers by ruling that the increases had become effective before the
freeze, even though few teachers had actually worked at the higher
salary. In an interesting passage, the court alluded to the administra-
tive difficulties of Phase I:
The Court recognizes the difficulty incumbent in the ad-
. ministration of the Stabilization Act and Executive Order.
The Court takes notice that. the federal agencies responsible
for this gargantuan task have been swamped with myriad re-
quests for administrative determinations and have been beset
• from all directions with inquiries as to the specific application
of the wage-price freeze. Conflicting guidelines are perhaps in-
evitable because of the immediacy and urgency of the admin-
istrative inquiries. Nevertheless, the Court cannot elevate to
the level of enforceable law the inconsistent and contradictory
directives provided by the various Circulars. Instead, the
Court will adhere to Regulation No. 1 as properly interpretive
of the Executive Order 130
In Huber v. Connally, 131
 the court enjoined a landlord from in-
creasing rents above the ceiling fixed by the Regulations and directed
it to restore to tenants the amount of the overcharge. The landlord
did not challenge the authority of the President to promulgate the
regulations; rather it asserted that the Cost of Living Council rent
regulation was inconsistent with Executive Order No. 11615 in that
it imposed a ceiling based on rents charged for the same property
whereas the Order had frozen rents at the level charged for similar
units in a substantial number of transactions."' This inconsistency,
12° 333 F. Supp. 418, EC If 9996 at 9887 (1971).
13° Id. at 423-24, EC If 9996 at 9891.
131 337 F. Supp. 507, EC a 9975 at 9830 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
132 Id. at 510, EC if 9975 at 9832.
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according to the landlord, amounted to a due process violation which
the court disposed of by ruling that the challenged regulation did not
"manifest a patently arbitrary classification; utterly lacking in rational
justification.'"33 The same issue was again raised in United States v.
Intone Corp. 184 with the same result. The court compared the Exec-
utive Order with the Regulation and concluded that they were perfectly
consistent with each other. 158
In the only criminal action to date, United States v. Futura,
a landlord was convicted of unlawfully raising rents during Phases I
and II and engaging in an unlawful practice designed to get more rent
(kickbacks). An "unconstitutional delegation" argument was rejected
on the authority of the Meat Cutters case.'" Deciding first that Con-
gress intended Section 204 of the Act to create a penal offense, the court
then ruled that the section was not void for vagueness. 138 The conduct
of the defendant was flagrant, especially with respect to the demand
that the tenants kick back additional rent payments to conceal the
violations.
In United States v. Cincinnati Transit, Inc.,'" the court, reserving
judgment on a rollback of a transit company's fare increase and a
restoration of a service cut, found the company's actions in violation
of the price freeze regulations. The standards furnished by the Act
were declared "intelligible," at least when examined in the context of
Congressional purpose."° Of more doubtful precedent, the court con-
cluded that, despite the language of Section 210(a) of the Act which
authorizes suits by private plaintiffs, "including an action for declara-
tory judgment" Congress did not intend to permit declaratory actions
against the government by a company which itself was about to be
charged with a violation."' According to the court, it was unfair that
private parties should beat the Government to the punch.
It seems apparent from these cases that a general challenge to
the economic legislation on constitutional grounds is doomed to failure.
Wage and price stabilization is not novel. It is not a startling departure
from economic custom. The concept of a federal government with
limited powers has just about vanished. The political power unit is
the nation. If inflation is a national problem, it must be solved by the
national legislature. The courts are simply not prepared to intervene.
133 Id. at 512, EC 11 9975 at 9833.
184 334 F. Supp. 905, EC If 9947 at 9767 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
138 Id. at 908, EC If 9947 at 9769.
180 - F. Supp. —, EC 11 9959 at 9790 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
187 Id. at —, EC g 9959 at 9791.
188 Id. at —, EC 11 9959 at 9793.
189 337 F. Supp, 1068, EC If 9950 at 9773 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
140 Id. at 1072, EC If 9950 at 9779.
111 Id. at 1074, EC 11 9950 at 9778.
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Rather, they will preserve their independence in another manner, by
striking down particular regulations where their application to par-
ticular defendants is unfair. If the need for stabilization passes, or if
economic dislocations occur by continued application of the regulations,
the courts will gradually nullify them. The point is that no client should
be advised to ignore the Act on the surmise that the underlying regu-
latory scheme is invalid. It may be invalid in a theoretical or specula-
tive scheme, but it will not be ruled so. If a particular regulation is
unfair, arguments based on improper delegation, due process, vague-
ness, arbitrary action, or inconsistency, all of which are nothing more
than legal euphemisms for unfairness, will continue to be the major
avenues available to parties seeking relief from the economic controls.
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